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One of the phenomena of the twentieth century, chainstores, are remarkably little 
studied by economists. Amongst open questions are the following: What factors influence the 
pattern of their openings? Does the spread of one constrain others having broadly the same 
retail offer? Do they locate close to competitors?  To answer such questions, one must 
examine a time path of development- put simply one must observe actual entry.  This is 
precisely what is done in a series of papers (Toivanen and Waterson, 2000; 2001; Sault, 
Toivanen and Waterson -hereafter STW, 2002; forthcoming) we are working on concerning 
the spread of restaurant outlets in the UK. 
Why chain restaurants in the UK?  The major reason is pragmatic.  They have spread 
rapidly and they are fairly straightforward objects of study.  In several cases, e.g. McDonalds, 
development is largely through organic growth.  Choice of outlet size is generally of second 
order importance compared with the choice of outlet location.  Until recently, the picture in 
many cases is one of significant entry without substantial exit.  Finally, market structures are 
commonly straightforward.  Thus, patterns may be relatively easily observed. A key feature 
of our data is that we have complete histories of entry over the relevant period. 
Our unit of observation is the UK Local Authority District (LAD) in a given year.  
We view these as approximating to local markets for the relevant products, though we also 
test this assumption. Importantly, comparable data on key variables are available for long 
periods.1 The LAD is administratively relevant, since they are charged with implementing 
planning. In order to open a fast food outlet, that outlet/ location must be designated as “A3” 
(food and drink) usage.2 Moreover, LADs differ in their core characteristics. Our 
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identification strategy is a development from papers such as Timothy Bresnahan and Peter 
Reiss (1991)- we identify conduct using the variation in characteristics across space and time 
faced by the same decision-maker(s).  This paper sketches the main elements of our program, 
then examines a particular issue, the micro-geography of location, in detail. 
I Analytical Strands 
One branch of our work involves exploring the expansion paths of individual chains 
over time (STW, 2002).  We find that the factors determining the inter-temporal geographical 
spread of outlets are in part as expected- locations with greater population and greater 
population density get outlets first.  However, distances from Head Office also matter- more 
distant districts are slower to get outlets. We are currently examining whether those outlets a 
chain decides to franchise are subject to the same forces as those it operates itself, using a 
competing hazards approach.  Another important factor is whether outlets have already been 
set up in neighboring areas. We find that if a chain develops in a particular direction initially, 
this influence is amplified over time.  These findings, although tentative, point to the 
fascinating implication that chance factors can have a significant influence on chain 
development, and therefore potentially on the regional provision of outlet types. 
Another strand of our work examines interaction between chains.  Conventional 
wisdom (expressed e.g. in Avner Shaked and John Sutton, 1990) is that the presence of one 
player in a market constrains others from entering.  Thus, one of our most surprising and 
controversial findings to date (Toivanen and Waterson, 2001) relates to the counter service 
burger market, which in the UK is arguably a duopoly over the period we examine: The 
development of one chain appears not to constrain the other from opening in the same 
district. In fact, where one locates, the other is more likely to do so also, consistent with one 
chain learning from another.  In the remainder of the paper, we examine this learning 
hypothesis in a new way, based upon the micro-geography of districts. 
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II A Micro- Geographic Approach 
We wish to test the hypothesis that the outlet of the following duopoly player 
(McDonalds or Burger King) locates in a position suggestive of learning from the first player 
to enter that district.  
The theory is as follows.  In a two-stage location/ differentiation then price model (see 
e.g. Richard Schmalensee, 1978), suppose outlets locate without regard to label (a maintained 
assumption in much of the relevant literature) and the degree of price competition is known.  
Take an example with three outlets.  There will be a tendency for the outlets to be located 
some distance apart; otherwise an outlet will not experience enough trade to make it 
profitable. There may be agglomeration3, which means that outlets are not evenly spread, but 
this does not imply anything about which two outlets are closer than which other pair. 
Suppose now that identity matters.  Other things equal, anticipated price competition 
between the outlets of different firms will cause them to be located further apart than the 
outlets of the same firm4.  Similarly, if an existing player employs a pre-emptive locational 
strategy, this will also move outlets from different labels apart.  On the other hand, if there is 
significant product differentiation between the firms, and (virtually) no inter-firm price 
competition, then the outlets of different firms may be somewhat nearer to each other than the 
outlets of the same firm- e.g., people choosing which food to purchase go to a certain part of 
town, choosing pizza or Chinese once there. A crucial element in this argument is that firms 
with multi-characteristic goods may want to maximize differentiation in the main 
characteristic while minimizing the distance in other characteristics (Andreas Irmen and 
Jacques-Francois Thisse, 1998). We consider the main differentiating characteristic between 
McDonalds and Burger King to be distance5. E.g. Raphael Thomadsen (2000) calculates that 
US consumers are willing to travel 1/3 mile to save one dollar on their meals; given the prices 
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of meals, this suggests to us that distance is a major characteristic differentiating outlets.  
Proceeding under this assumption, we re-examine it at the end of the section.  
Alternatively to product differentiation, if there is learning from the other player’s 
location about whether and why that is a good location, we may expect the follower to locate 
relatively close to an outlet of the leading firm.  It should also more likely locate near an early 
outlet than a recently opened outlet of the other player, and the distance from that should not 
be too great- it should be in the same shopping area, for example. 
In order to operationalize testing, we selected all the local authority districts in Great 
Britain6 for which the following hold: 
1.Both key players (McDonalds and Burger King) are in the market at the end of our period. 
2.We can date order which player was first into the market, and determine the timing of 
outlets up to the point at which the other player entered. 
3.There are at least three outlets in total. 
From the set of 57 districts fitting these criteria, we stopped recording outlet details 
regarding location (i.e. their postcode) once the second player had entered for the first time.  
Our set of districts is divided into two subsets.  In the first, there are three or more outlets (up 
to 6), of which only the most recent is the outlet of a different firm than all previous entries.  
In the second set, there are three outlets, with the chronological order of outlet openings by 
firms A and B being A, B, A or A, B, B7.  Using the facility on http://www.streetmap.co.uk/ 
for converting postcodes to Ordnance Survey grid co-ordinates, each was mapped to a co-
ordinate8 and the Euclidean distance between outlets calculated. 
With the first subset, comprising 34 districts, we test whether the distance between the 
outlet of the following firm and any of the leader’s outlets is greater or less than the distance 
between any of the leaders’ outlets.  The Null is that there is no difference on average.  
Hence, under the Null, if the entry pattern is A, A, B, the probability of the distance between 
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B and one of the A’s being less than the distance between the two A’s is 2/3.  Similarly, if the 
pattern is A, A, A, A, A, B, then the equivalent probability is only 1/3 (5 ways out of 15). Our 
test uses a series of simulations to take into account that the probability under the Null varies 
across observations9.  The districts, entry patterns and probabilities are listed in Table 1. 
For each observation in the sample, a simulation round involved a random draw of a 
zero-one variable, where the indicator function takes the value 
1 iff mindist (A, B) < mindist (A, A’), for all A, A’ 
for a market with n “A” outlets and one “B” outlet and the probability of this 
happening comes from the above calculations. We then weight these draws by the relative 
frequency of the different market structures that we observe, and calculate the distribution of 
the sum of “1” answers we have generated, which is a sufficient statistic for the test.  The 99th 
percentile of that generated distribution, 28, is compared to what we observe in the data. This 
figure, 29, easily allows us to reject the Null at better than 1% level.  This is evidence in favor 
of either the product differentiation or learning stories and against the pre-emption story.  
However, subset 1 is not geared to distinguishing between the first two possibilities. 
The second subset enables us to distinguish more clearly between the learning and 
product differentiation hypotheses.  Thus, learning must come from the first outlet in each 
case, but product differentiation affects the distance between either outlet pair. In this second 
subset, with form A1, B1, A2, or A1, B1, B2, (or in four cases, a tie between A1, B1, B2 and A1, 
A2, B1) we test whether the distance between the first outlet of the follower (B1) and the 
initial outlet (A1) is less than the distance between the other pairs, follower and third outlet 
and initial outlet and third outlet.  Under the Null, the probability of this is 1/3. If product 
differentiation is important, we expect a greater distance between the two outlets of the same 
firm than between either of the other pairs, whereas under the learning alternative we expect 
the least distance between the outlets B1 and A1.   
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Twenty of the 23 districts, listed in Table 2, across which this test can be performed, 
satisfy the alternative hypothesis that is consistent with learning.  With a t-value of -7.64, this 
allows us to reject the Null at better than 1% level.  We can alternatively test the difference 
between mean distances across the three pairs.  As seen in Table 2, there are large numerical 
differences between these mean values.  Again, the alternative consistent with learning is 
accepted over the Null and the product differentiation alternative, with the t-value related to 
the lesser difference being -3.57 and the difference between the other two mean distances 
being insignificant. 
A potential problem with our interpretation is that distance may not be the main 
differentiating characteristic of these firms and that we may merely have documented the 
effects of the early leader outlets being in the best locations10. After all, we do not control for 
within-market variation in demand in the above experiments. However, in ongoing work we 
are developing proxies for unobserved outlet profitability, one being the rank of the outlet in 
the opening order of the firm.  This control is based on the idea that both within and between 
markets, the firms open first in the most profitable location. If it is unobserved location-
specific demand that drives the documented behavior, we should see the follower locate 
closer to those outlets that were opened earlier.  So far, we have found no evidence of this. 
III Concluding Remarks 
These results on micro-geography point sharply to the hypothesis that firms learn 
from the outlet decisions of the other player, in practice far more commonly that Burger King 
learns from the outlet decisions of McDonalds than vice versa.  This is consistent with the 
continuing development we observe in STW (2002).  But it is not only the relative 
magnitudes that are strongly confirmatory of learning.  Across our 57-market sample, the 
median of the minimum (Euclidian) distance between the qualifying outlet pairs (A1, B1) is 
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only 260 meters, clear evidence of a tendency towards closeness and strong circumstantial 
evidence in favor of learning! 
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Table 1: Pattern of entry up till the arrival of the second firm. 
 
District Entry 
pattern 
hypothesis nearest to prob y prob y1 
4 mmb L/PD 2  2/3  1/3 
26 mmb L/PD 1  2/3  1/3 
50 mmmb L/PD 1 1/2  1/6 
53 mmb L/PD 2  2/3  1/3 
59 mmmmmb L/PD 1   1/3   1/15 
89 mmb P    2/3   1/3 
94 mmmb L/PD 1 1/2   1/6 
100 mmb L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
117 mmb L/PD 2   2/3   1/3 
180 mmb P    2/3   1/3 
181 mmb P    2/3   1/3 
231 bbm L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
275 mmb L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
283 mmb L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
291 mmmb L/PD 1   1/2   1/6 
292 mmmmb L/PD 2   2/5   1/10 
296 mmb L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
309 mmb L/PD 2   2/3   1/3 
314 mmmb L/PD 1 1/2 1/6 
315 mmb L/PD 2   2/3   1/3 
316 mmmb L/PD 1   1/2   1/6 
323 mmb L/PD 2   2/3   1/3 
331 mmmmmb L/PD 2   1/3   1/15 
333 mmmb L/PD 2 1/2   1/6 
370 mmb L/PD 1   2/3   1/3 
422 mmb P    2/3   1/3 
437 mmmb L/PD 3 1/2   1/6 
438 mmmb L/PD 3   1/2   1/6 
444 mmmmb L/PD 1   2/5   1/10 
448 mmmb L/PD 3 1/2   1/6 
451 mmmb L/PD 1 1/2   1/6 
453 mmmb L/PD 1   1/2   1/6 
455 mmmmb P    2/5   1/10 
456 mmb L/PD 2   2/3   1/3 
 Score 29/34 16/34   
      
Notes: Column 1 is the district reference # in Regional Trends.  Column 2 refers to the date order in which 
outlets enter a district (m= McD, b = BK).  Column 3 refers to the hypothesis that is supported by the 
observation in question- the pre-emption/ lack of price competition hypothesis (P) or the learning/ product 
differentiation hypothesis (L/PD)- see text.  Column 4 concerns the rank order of the nearest of the existing 
outlets to which the follower firm locates.  The final two columns refer to probabilities of the closest proximity 
being between follower and leader and between follower and first lead outlet under the null. 
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Table 2: Entry patterns across the first three outlets where the second has a different identity 
from the first 
 
1 2  3 4  5 6 7 8 
District Location 
pattern 
 m1b1 
dist. 
m2b/mb2 
dist. 
 “same” 
dist. 
min 
diff 
Hypothesis First? 
12 mbm  152.47 2533.71  2555.77 152.47 Y Y 
46 mbb  140.76 356.81  217.83 140.76 Y Y 
55 mbm  436.24 1157.80  1591.71 436.24 Y Y 
65 mbm  1974.51 1176.67  1108.04 1176.67 N N 
96 bmb  409.64 981.07  779.93 409.64 Y Y 
107 mbm  147.87 1859.73  1776.09 147.87 Y Y 
111 mbm  177.92 1553.90  1506.13 177.92 Y Y 
116 mbm  311.24 1606.43  1388.46 311.24 Y Y 
128 mbm  113.18 4846.00  4778.35 113.18 Y Y 
148 mmb/mbm  62.97 319.83  331.22 62.97 Y Y 
166 mbm  440.24 3785.24  3662.42 440.24 Y Y 
168 bmm  242.50 8718.34  8592.80 242.50 Y Y 
178 mbm  252.74 8983.19  9235.59 252.74 Y Y 
219 mbm  112.06 2013.49  2013.61 112.06 Y Y 
248 mmb/mbm  1085.85 2336.91  3422.26 1085.85 Y Y 
297 mbm  138.44 1774.08  1689.09 138.44 Y Y 
306 mmb/mbm  241.21 5027.90  5009.34 241.21 Y Y 
310 mbb  789.85 580.08  1020.81 580.08 Y N 
365 mbm  275.05 3387.25  3161.18 275.05 Y Y 
385 mbb  324.03 376.18  640.07 324.03 Y Y 
410 bmb  1771.81 3151.34  2748.24 1771.81 Y Y 
419 bmm  3231.69 141.23  3092.29 141.23 Y N 
435 mmb/mbm  81.01 301.14  380.80 81.01 Y Y 
 Mean   561.45 2476.88  2639.22 383.27 22/23 20/23 
 s.d.  774.50 2450.80  2393.17 417.93   
 median  252.74 1774.08  1776.09 242.50   
          
t test 1 Is prob of 
20/23 
chance? 
(1/3-
20/3)/((20/23*3/23)/23)0.5= 
-7.64 
No    
t test 2 Diff 
between 
means 
(561.45-2476.88)/535.9=  -
3.57 
Yes    
          
          
Notes: Columns 1-2 as for Table 1. Columns 3-5 refer to Euclidean distances (in meters) between different 
outlets- between follower and initial lead outlet (m1b1), between follower and second lead outlet (m2b or mb2) 
and between the same (m,m; b,b) outlets. Column 6 gives the minima of the distances between different outlet 
types.  Columns 7 and 8 relate to whether the L/PD hypothesis is supported and whether the hypothesis that the 
second firm locates closest to the first outlet of the first firm is supported, respectively. 
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* Sault and Waterson- Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 
7AL, UK; Toivanen- Helsinki School of Economics, PO Box 1210, 00101 Helsinki, Finland. 
Email correspondence should be addressed to michael.waterson@warwick.ac.uk.  We are 
grateful to the ESRC for funding this research (award #R000238402).  We thank Michael 
Mazzeo (discussant), Peter Davis and Paul Walsh for helpful comments. 
1 By lucky chance, the last major re-organization of the structure of districts was completed in 
1974, McDonalds’ entry date into the UK, since which all changes have been minor.  Basic 
demographic data is available since 1974.  To these, we add data on distance of the district 
from the respective companies’ Head Offices, in miles by road. Descriptive statistics 
regarding districts and information on the history of the industry are available in STW 
(2002), Tables 1 and 2 respectively; see also Toivanen and Waterson (2001).  
2 Prevailing planning guidance states that sufficient supply from existing outlets is not a 
criterion for refusing an A3 listing to a proposed new outlet.    
3 Arturs Kalnins and Wilbur Chung (2001) explore retail/ service agglomeration. 
4 In practice, little price competition takes place between outlets of the same chain in the UK. 
5 In a food court, we see several outlets providing food variety, but not two burger outlets.   
6 Excluding the three inner London boroughs and outlying islands. 
7 In four cases, we are unsure of characterisation since the second and third outlets open in 
quick succession, but this does not affect the hypotheses tested. 
8 Each UK postcode covers around 20 or fewer addresses, roughly a block or less. 
9 We are very grateful to Michael Pitt for his work on the details of this approach including 
providing the coding which enabled this test. We took a total of 40,000 simulations. 
10 A further potential constraint on location concerns contractual encroachment- the company 
may be reluctant to locate one franchisee near another because the first may take out an 
 12
                                                                                                                                                  
action in respect of loss of market.  This is not a significant legal issue in the UK, so far as we 
are aware.  Moreover, of our 57 districts, in only four, where the first firm’s first and second 
outlets are both franchised, could it be an issue.  In one of these four, the two franchised 
outlets are themselves only 218 meters apart. 
. 
